Palestine-Israel war: ‘Little hope for Hamas to retain power in Gaza,’ say experts
The conflict has caused significant casualties on both sides, with over 900 Israelis and foreign nationals killed and more than 700 Palestinians.
“This cycle is no longer going to be acceptable to the Israeli public or political leadership. Now, the question is what kind of government will emerge in Gaza after the war.”
On October 7, 2023, Hamas militants launched an unprecedented attack on Israel, resulting in over 1,200 Israeli casualties and 150 hostages. Israel responded with airstrikes, a Gaza Strip blockade, and declared war, mobilizing 360,000 army reserves.
The conflict has caused significant casualties on both sides, with over 900 Israelis and foreign nationals killed and more than 700 Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
This unprecedented attack by Hamas has potentially far-reaching consequences for the region. On Wednesday, Prime Minister Netanyahu and opposition member Benny Gantz formed a national unity government to oversee the ongoing war and Israel’s anticipated ground invasion of Gaza.
‘Hamas has put itself in an impossible position’
In a published analysis, Jon Alterman, the head of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, addressed the strategic value of Hamas’s attack, saying it could change the status quo in Gaza.
“Hamas aimed to penetrate Israel in a way that would give it centrality and relevance for decades to come, but by killing hundreds of Israelis and taking 150 hostages in the first days, Hamas has put itself in an impossible position. Israel is united in its determination to change the status quo ante and completely push Hamas from power,” Alterman wrote.
“It is hard to imagine that Hamas will be able to retain power in Gaza when the dust settles. There may be hope for the Palestinian national cause, but there’s very little hope for Hamas.”
He added that this week’s unprecedented attacks could change the status quo in Gaza.
“Since Hamas took power in 2007, the Israeli military periodically would go into Gaza, fight with Hamas, and destroy some of its infrastructure. Hamas would rebuild for a few years, and then the cycle would repeat itself,” Alterman continued.
“Israelis called this ‘mowing the grass,’ an unpleasant but necessary repetitive task.”
“This cycle is no longer going to be acceptable to the Israeli public or political leadership. Now, the question is what kind of government will emerge in Gaza after the war.”
Alterman said it might entail greater control for the Palestinian National Authority based in Ramallah, some sort of new local governance, governance under the tutelage of the Israeli military, or perhaps a coalition of Arab states.
“There are a lot of possibilities, but it is hard to imagine that Hamas can remain in power.”
Hostage-taking a ‘game-changer’
In particular, Hamas’s taking of hostages is both unprecedented and will affect the events that happen next, said Alterman.
“Hamas took so many hostages from so many different places, threatened to use them as human shields, and threatened to execute them as part of its war aims,” he wrote.
“The Israelis have said that the hostages will not affect their calculations, but that is likely untrue.”
“At the same time, Israel is not likely to forgo its determination to have a comprehensive ground operation in Gaza that pushes Hamas from power because of the hostages.”
“Strategically, Israel will likely act irrespective of the hostages while tactically trying to free hostages in any way that it can. Social media coverage of the hostages could change this, but it is unlikely.”
Alexander Palmer, a research associate with the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, said while Hamas has taken hostages before, this has never happened anywhere approaching this number, which remains unknown but is likely around 150.
“Israel is extremely sensitive to hostage-taking, as demonstrated by its decision to trade more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in 2014 and the fact that negotiations over two Israeli civilians and the bodies of two IDF soldiers held by Hamas have remained unresolved for almost a decade. The hostages taken also include an unknown number of foreign nationals, further complicating the situation.”
Palmer also said the number of hostages will complicate Israel’s response in unprecedented ways.
“Netanyahu is rhetorically committed to a massive response, but retrieving hostages requires smaller-scale action like negotiations or special forces operations. The hostages will make Israel’s military decisions much harder because Hamas is threatening to kill hostages in retaliation for Israeli airstrikes, and the presence of hostages in specific areas will be a key unknown for IDF operators.”
Why did Hamas attack now?
According to Daniel Byman, a senior fellow at the Transnational Threats Project at CSIS and a professor at Georgetown University, Hamas had multiple motivations for its recent actions.
The legitimacy of Hamas as a political entity hinges on a combination of service provision in Gaza, where it effectively governs, and its use of violent resistance against Israel.
Byman said this approach sets it apart from the Palestinian Authority (PA), which administers the West Bank. Hamas positions itself as a less corrupt alternative to the PA, “a claim that isn’t hard to support.”
It also, he said, offers public services like waste disposal and law enforcement in Gaza. However, Israeli economic pressures have constrained its ability to enhance the well-being of Palestinians, resulting in persistently high levels of unemployment and poverty in the region. This has amplified the significance of armed resistance for Hamas’ political agenda, especially as PA President Mahmoud Abbas ages without a clear successor.
Byman said the recent attack also comes on the heels of several years marked by escalating violence and more frequent crises.
The unchecked expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, acts of violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians, and the evident racism within some members of Netanyahu’s ruling coalition have contributed to discontent and pessimism among Palestinians.
Additionally, a growing number of provocative incidents at the al-Aqsa Mosque, one of Islam’s holiest sites, has steadily escalated tensions, with Hamas explicitly citing these incidents as a driving factor behind its attacks.
The escalation between Israel and Palestine will also impact external actors like Lebanon’s Hezbollah, said Alterman.
“The risks for escalation are real, but it is unlikely that Hezbollah had any advance notice this was coming,” said Alterman. “In fact, most people in the Hamas leadership probably did not know this was coming. Hezbollah feels it has a lot to lose.”
“The Lebanese economy is in crisis. Lebanon went from being a middle-income state to a state where 80 to 85 percent of the population is below the poverty line,” he said. “There is no question that an all-out war with Israel would result in the complete destruction of the south and large-scale destruction in other parts of Lebanon, and Hezbollah does not know if it could survive that outcome.”
“Lebanon is very vulnerable now, and the last thing it needs is another war with Israel. Hezbollah leadership has the instinct to give moral and psychological support to Hamas without incurring Israel’s full wrath.”
Alterman said Israel’s instinct is not to get into a spiral of escalation with Hezbollah that can turn this into a two-front war, especially because “Hezbollah is much better armed than Hamas.”
“Hezbollah has up to 150,000 rockets and missiles, many of which were supplied through Syria. It is spread over a much larger area than the Gaza Strip. And Israel does not control all the access points to Lebanon the way it controls the access points to the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah does not want to be seen sitting on its hands, but it also does not want to provoke a full-scale Israeli response. Any number of things could change that, including Israeli attacks that create extraordinary humanitarian suffering or images of lots of maimed women and children.”
Alterman said the war makes it harder for Arab states to deal with Israel in the near term.
“In the longer term, it may create possibilities for Arab engagement with Gaza, which could actually contribute to Arab-Israeli rapprochement. Israel and the Arab states are strategically aligned on Gaza. Virtually all Arab governments are hostile to Hamas.”
“They also fear the tentacles of Iran, which has helped bankroll Hamas and trained some of its fighters. Arab governments may have a role in helping shape a political outcome in Gaza that simultaneously helps advance Palestinian national aspirations while also dealing a blow to Islamist movements and Iranian proxies.”
Impact on the Middle East
As for the impacts on the wider region, Dr Sanam Vakil, director for the Middle East and North Africa Program at the think tank Chatham House, said “the tremors from Hamas’ attack on Israel” and Israel’s military response are being felt far beyond their borders, where the fighting is currently concentrated.
In a statement, she said: “There are clear fears across the Middle East that the region will become mired in a broader war that could draw in Palestinians in the West Bank and Jordan, Egypt (which shares a border with Gaza), Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and their patron Iran. Gulf Arab countries also fear their domestic security will be affected by cascading violence.”
“But the war has erupted following a prolonged period of regional-led de-escalation and reconciliation efforts. Since 2019, countries, including Israel, have been increasingly willing to find pragmatic, workable compromises based on shared interests – a phenomenon sometimes referred to as building a ‘new Middle East.’”
“Progress has not been complete or perfect, but the regional context for the Israel–Hamas war is very different from that of even ten years ago.”
Vakil said the conflict will present the most rigorous examination of regional collaboration.
However, she said, Middle Eastern nations should not shy away from this challenge. Now, she said, is the opportune time for regional stakeholders to join forces to discover fresh approaches for calming the ongoing conflict.
“Since 2019, Middle Eastern states have embarked on a prolonged period of realist regional diplomacy, driven by decreasing US engagement, geopolitical shifts stemming from the war in Ukraine, and a broader regional re-prioritization of domestic economic needs.”
This has seen the normalization of relations between Israel, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in the 2020 Abraham Accords, the end of the Qatar blockade in 2021, a reset of Gulf–Turkish relations in 2023, and the restoration of Iranian–Saudi ties brokered by China, she said.
“Yemeni negotiations are also underway, as is the rehabilitation of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad after a decade of civil and externally sponsored war,” she said.
“Qatar and Oman, meanwhile, played an important role managing indirect dialogue between Washington and Tehran, helping to secure the release of American hostages.”
According to Vakil,the US and European partners have celebrated this period of de-escalation.
“Less than two weeks ago, US National Security advisor Jake Sullivan, while acknowledging that challenges remain, stated that ‘the amount of time I have to spend on crisis and conflict in the Middle East today, compared to any of my predecessors going back to 9/11, is significantly reduce’.”
While the regional rest has shown its ‘fragility’ in the wake of the Hamas-sparked war, Vakil said today, the nations in the region have a genuine chance to capitalize on their recent successes and establish a cohesive, credible initiative to reduce tensions in the conflict.
“The last five years [have] shown their real desire to normalize relations with Israel and settle conflicts in the pursuit of mutual interest.”
“The Hamas attacks, in turn, illustrate that such efforts cannot move forward without addressing the festering unresolved disputes that previous normalization efforts sought to paper over.”
“Key to any de-escalation efforts and broader conflict management will be the Gulf states, who have the ability to appeal to both Israel and Palestinians but also to engage with Iran on its regionally destabilizing role.”
“The part played by the US, China and other international actors may well still be significant. But MENA countries should lead on the creation of a realistic, achievable pathway to peace – built on local knowledge and abilities.”